How Did a Go-Around Fail to Save First Air Flight 6560?
First Air Flight 6560 crashed near Resolute Bay on August 20, 2011, killing 12 of 15 people on board. The Boeing 737-200 struck a hill obscured by clouds during final approach. Investigators found that a late descent…
Expectation vs. Reality in Final Approach
The investigation revealed a disconnect between the crew's intended flight path and the aircraft's actual trajectory during the critical final moments.
| The plan needed | What happened | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|
| Follow localizer signal along runway centerline | Drifted parallel and east of runway centerline | Aircraft struck terrain instead of runway |
| Autopilot maintains stable approach path | Inadvertent partial disengagement of autopilot | Loss of precise lateral guidance |
| Compass provides accurate heading reference | Drift in aircraft compass system | Crew unaware of significant off-course deviation |
Operational Context and Weather Decisions
First Air Flight 6560 left Yellowknife Airport at 09:40 Central Daylight Time on August 20, 2011, heading for Resolute Bay in Nunavut. The Boeing 737-210C, registered C-GNWN, carried eleven passengers and four crew members, including Captain Blair Rutherford and First Officer David Hare. The flight operated under instrument flight rules, a standard procedure for navigating in conditions where visual references are limited. Reports of deteriorating weather at Resolute Bay reached the crew shortly after take-off. Despite these warnings, the flight crew agreed not to divert to an alternate airport. They proceeded with the approach, relying on the airport's Instrument Landing System (ILS) to guide them through the cloud cover. This decision to continue the approach set the stage for the subsequent navigation errors.
Unlike many remote northern airports, it offers the infrastructure necessary for jet operations in challenging weather. However, the airport lacks permanent radar coverage, though a temporary installation was active during the 2011 Operation Nanook military exercise. The aircraft was fitted with a gravel kit, allowing operations from unpaved surfaces, but this modification did not affect the electronic navigation systems. The crew’s reliance on the ILS localizer signal was essential for maintaining the correct track. The absence of radar coverage meant that air traffic control could not provide real-time vectoring or surveillance of the aircraft’s precise position during the final descent phase.
Navigation Errors and System Failures
At 11:38, the aircraft made its final turn to align with runway 35, with the crew reporting a position ten nautical miles from the airport. Instead of following the localizer signal along the runway track, the aircraft settled on a path roughly parallel and to the east of the centerline. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada identified several contributing factors to this deviation. A late initiation of the descent placed the aircraft in a difficult position relative to the approach path. Additionally, an inadvertent partial disengagement of the autopilot occurred during the final approach. This disengagement likely compromised the aircraft’s ability to maintain the precise lateral guidance provided by the ILS. The crew may not have immediately recognized the extent of the deviation due to the cloud cover obscuring visual references.
A drift in the aircraft’s compass system further complicated the situation, providing inaccurate heading information to the flight crew. Poor communication between Captain Rutherford and First Officer Hare meant that the growing discrepancy between the intended and actual flight path was not effectively addressed. The aircraft drifted significantly off course from the final approach path without the crew realizing the severity of the error. The combination of system malfunctions and human factors created a scenario where the aircraft was flying towards terrain rather than the runway. The lack of radar coverage at the airport meant that external monitoring could not alert the crew to their deviation. These factors converged to create a hazardous situation that the crew struggled to manage in the final minutes of the flight.
The Final Moments and Impact
At 11:41, the crew initiated a go-around maneuver, a standard procedure to abort a landing when conditions are not safe. However, this action came too late to prevent the disaster. The Transportation Safety Board determined that the go-around was initiated only two seconds before the aircraft struck the ground. Flight 6560 collided with terrain abeam the runway, approximately one nautical mile to the east. The impact occurred in rugged terrain, with the aircraft breaking up into three main sections upon collision. An intense post-crash fire consumed most of the center section of the Boeing 737-210C. The suddenness of the impact and the severity of the breakup left little chance for survival for many on board. The timing of the go-around highlights the critical nature of early recognition and correction of navigation errors.
The crash site was located less than two kilometers west of the Resolute Bay Community. The aircraft had last made radio contact about five nautical miles from the airport, crashing approximately ten minutes later. The two female survivors reported that the impact came completely unexpectedly, with no obvious problem prior to the collision. This testimony underscores the subtle nature of the navigation errors and the difficulty of detecting them in instrument meteorological conditions. The aircraft’s deviation from the localizer signal went unnoticed until it was too late to correct. The rapid sequence of events from go-around initiation to impact illustrates the unforgiving nature of controlled flight into terrain accidents. The physical destruction of the aircraft was extensive, complicating the immediate rescue efforts.
Rescue Operations and Aftermath
Rescue operations were carried out by Canadian Armed Forces personnel temporarily stationed at Resolute for Operation Nanook. This military exercise coincidentally included a simulated remote aircraft crash as one of its main training scenarios. The presence of military personnel on site facilitated a rapid response to the crash. Three passengers walked away from the wreckage with serious wounds, necessitating urgent hospital care. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police confirmed the crash and the number of casualties. The efficiency of the rescue effort was aided by the proximity of the military exercise and the preparedness of the personnel involved. The coincidence of the exercise scenario with the real-life accident provided a unique and tragic opportunity for a swift response.
Twelve people died in the impact, including both pilots, two flight attendants, and eight passengers. The three survivors were a seven-year-old girl, a forty-eight-year-old male, and a twenty-three-year-old female. The girl received a leg fracture and was found sitting on a rock in tears by the twenty-three-year-old female, who also managed to escape the wreckage. The two older survivors were taken to Ottawa for medical treatment, while the younger female was treated in Iqaluit. All three survivors were reported to be in stable condition. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada issued an investigation update in January 2012, classifying the accident as a controlled flight into terrain. The investigation highlighted the importance of crew communication and situational awareness in preventing such accidents.
Timeline: First Air Flight 6560 crashes 1 mile from the Resolute Bay runway
- August 20, 2011, 09:40 CDT Flight 6560 departs Yellowknife
- August 20, 2011, 11:38 Final turn to runway 35
- August 20, 2011, 11:41 Go-around initiated
- August 20, 2011, 11:41 Aircraft strikes terrain
- August 20, 2011 Canadian Armed Forces rescue survivors
- January 2012 TSB classifies as CFIT